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Abstract
This research seeks to answer the question: Does level of nationalist sentiment expressed within a country
affect the restrictiveness of the country’s intercountry adoption policy? Current literature has examined the
influence of the level of nationalism expressed in a country on adoptive parents in choosing from which
country to adopt; however, no study has examined the link between nationalism and country-specific
intercountry adoption policy. The variable of nationalist sentiment warrants study, for the Hague
Convention posits that intercountry adoption is a valid option only if “a suitable family cannot be found in
his or her [the adoptable child’s] State of origin” in order to preserve the child’s nationality of birth (Varnis,
2001: 42). This statement implies that domestic adoption is considered to be in the better interest of the
child versus intercountry adoption. In addition to the fact that “nationalists might subscribe to the view that
children ‘belong’ to their countries of birth and are better off growing up there (Leblang et al, 2015),”
countries may be reluctant to act as sending countries in intercountry adoption because adopting out their
children indicates an inability of the country to care for its children and thus “injures its national pride
(Varnis, 2001).” Although current literature somewhat addresses nationalist sentiment in terms of its effect
on intercountry adoption, no study has empirically examined the potential link between nationalist
sentiment and actual adoption policy restrictiveness, as my project proposes to do. Given the current
fragility of the practice of intercountry adoption as a whole, its recent politicization, and the rise of
populist/nationalistic leaders around the world, this research is especially relevant.
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INTRODUCTION
Functioning as a social and legal means of forming a family as a subsect of
adoption, intercountry, or international adoption refers to the process of familial
formation by which a child is adopted by a family residing in a country other than that of
the child’s country, thereby removing the child from his or her country of birth (Groza &
McCreery Bunkers, 2014). Whereas intercountry adoption has been practiced as an
institution for centuries, insufficient empirical data regarding intercountry adoption flows
as well as the influencing factors for intercountry adoption from the point of view of
adoptive parents and manifest in the adoption policies of states has been gathered
(Selman, 2010). Because intercountry adoption “now involves the transfer of more than
30,000 children each year from over 50 countries, (Masson, 2001: 142)” such study is
exceptionally necessary. In addition to my fascination with the sheer need for additional
research into intercountry adoption, the sociological and political aspects of adoption
fascinate me. While I passionately appreciate the goal of intercountry adoption to provide
a family for a child in need of a permanent, loving home, I recognize the sensitivity of the
practice in terms of the cultural divorce that often occurs in the migration of the child
from his or her country of origin to the country of adoption. Aligning with my concern,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child does not render foreign adoption an option that
the state is required to provide but rather requires the provision of foster placement,
domestic adoption, or institutionalization in order to preserve birth nationality (Varnis,
2001). Therefore, in order to attempt to reconcile that which is in the best interest of the
adoptable child with the institution of intercountry adoption, I will be researching
intercountry adoption policy (The United Nations, 1948). Specifically, my research will
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examine whether or not a correlation exists between level of governmental nationalism
within a country and its international adoption policy.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Promulgated in 1993, the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children and
Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption formally recognized the value of
intercountry adoption in providing a family for children and “provided a framework for
cooperation between sending and receiving countries to ensure that intercountry adoption
was only carried out in the best interest of the child (Selman, 2010: 6).” Much of the
current literature regarding intercountry adoption references the Hague Convention and
analyzes whether its implementation has affected the number of intercountry adoptions as
well as the level of restrictiveness manifest in sending countries’ adoption policies.
Currently, little empirical research regarding adoption policy exists; however, two
empirical studies examining the Hague Convention have been conducted in recent years.
In an empirical study of adoption policy restrictiveness among Sub-Saharan African
countries, data analysis indicated that Hague signatory countries are more likely to have
less restrictive adoption policy than non-Hague signatory countries (Breuning & Kousser,
2009). However, in a later empirical study of over one hundred sending countries, the
data demonstrated that openness to intercountry adoption is not explained by accession to
the Hague Convention to a degree of statistical significance (Breuning, 2012). Therefore,
while empirical data indicates a marginal correlation between the Hague Convention and
the restrictiveness of adoption policy, these findings suggest the Hague Convention may
not actually be as effective as intentioned in terms of keeping intercountry adoption
processes transparent.
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However, when combined with data analyzing the motives of adoptive parents as
well as the expectations of birth parents, the effects of The Hague Convention and level
of restrictiveness of adoption policy can be analyzed differently. Although not
empirically confirmed, one article theorized that implementation of The Hague
Convention in the United States, while adding necessary regulation to the intercountry
adoption process, would most likely deter families from adopting due to the additional
and potentially frustrating required steps (Bailey, 2009). Similarly, one study found that
prospective adoptive parents are more likely to adopt from countries “with a high
bureaucratic-regulatory quality, all else equal (Leblang et al., 2015)” than from those
lacking a high bureaucratic-regulatory quality. Such a quality aligns with the measures of
adoption policy restrictiveness utilized by Breuning and Kousser (2009); however, since
Leblang et al. (2015) theorizes that because adoptions from Hague signatory countries are
more costly than adoptions from non-Hague signatory countries, the study hypothesizes
that adoptive parents are more likely to adopt from non-Hague signatory countries as
confirmed via analysis of international adoption flows of “19 receiving countries and up
to 209 sending countries/entities, over the period from 1991-2010 (Leblang et al., 2015:
618).” Although not empirically confirmed, one study also recognizes that high adoption
costs as a result of the Hague Convention and competition among adoption agencies will
result in decreased standards for adoption practices and thereby harm rather than help
children (Masson, 2001). Thus, the efficacy of the Hague Convention warrants further
study, for if adoptive parents are seeking to avoid adopting from Hague signatory
countries, the goal of the Hague Convention to protect the best interest of the child may
be undermined. Also, largely due to ethical concerns, minimal evidence as to the effects
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of The Hague Convention and the adoption process on adopted children themselves
exists, as current literature merely describes a single case of re-adoption due to
discrepancies in Hague regulation between countries (Gibbs, 2011), and reports on the
attitudes of two small groups of children who were either domestically or internationally
adopted (Hawkins et al., 2007) thereby necessitating further research regarding the Hague
Convention’s efficacy in protecting the rights of children.
Additionally, several studies of adoptive parents indicate that their motivations for
adopting and their personal preferences regarding adopting a child influence the number
and types of adoptions, both domestically and internationally, which demonstrates that
adoptive parent motivation as well as level of restrictiveness of a sending country’s
adoption policy while under the regulations of the Hague Convention determine the
number of children adopted each year (Breuning, 2013; Groza & McCreery Bunkers,
2014; Ishizawa & Kubo, 2014; Leblang et al, 2015). For instance, empirical studies have
shown that in choosing between domestic and international adoption as well as in
choosing a sending country if pursuing intercountry adoption, adoptive parents will seek
the option that allows for greater likelihood of adopting an infant and the option that
allows for the shortest amount of time to complete the adoption process (Ishizawa &
Kubo, 2014; Leblang et al, 2015). The former desire translates into the conclusion that
“countries that send larger numbers of children do tend to send proportionally more very
young children,” (Breuning, 2013: 429), which further suggests that the motives of
adoptive parents are one of the biggest factors influencing the number of children
adopted out.
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While the aforementioned school of thought posits adoptive parents’ motivations
as central to explaining levels of intercountry adoption by sending country, other studies
have examined adoption flows from the perspective of birth parent preferences as well as
the way in which nationalist sentiment influences adoption policy (Groza & McCreery
Bunkers, 2014; Leblang et al., 2015; Roby & Matsumura, 2002; Roby & Ife, 2009). For
instance, in an interview study of birth mothers from the Marshall Islands whose children
were adopted by American parents, over 80% of birth mothers interviewed stated that at
the time of relinquishment, they believed that their child would be returned to them after
reaching adulthood, which demonstrates differences in cultural expectations surrounding
adoption between those of the Marshall Islands and the United States (Roby &
Matsumura, 2002). The authors of the research lament the fact that The Hague
Convention has not sought to mitigate such a disparity in expectation. Further criticizing
The Hague Convention, one study theorizes that the Hague Convention hinders the
autonomy of birth parents as it stipulates that the state, in tandem with professionals,
makes the decision on where to place children, thereby negating birth parents’ rights
(Groza & McCreery Bunkers, 2014).
Tied to birth parents’ rights is the variable of nationalism in terms of the way in
which nationalist sentiment affects intercountry adoption. Tenuously making the
connection between intercountry adoption and nationalism, Mayda and Rodrik (2005)
found that countries with higher levels of nationalism were less open to international
trade. However, Ahlerup and Hansson (2011) found in their study of nationalism and
international trade that nationalist sentiment may not actually play a role in openness to
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international trade. The discrepancy in the research thus warrant further study of
nationalism’s affect on a unique subset of international trade--intercountry adoption.
Furthermore, nationalism has been subject to empirical studies indicating that
countries with higher nationalist sentiment are less likely to act as receiving countries
than countries with lower nationalist sentiment in terms of comparing the effect of
transaction cost determinants of adoption on prospective adoptive parents (Leblang, et al.,
2015). Additionally, in terms of the United States as a sending country, research suggests
that United States nationalist sentiment causes the United States to be the number one
receiving country although this has not been sufficiently studied (Roby & Ife, 2009). The
lack of empirical research on nationalist sentiment in relation to the level of
restrictiveness of intercountry adoption policy necessitate investigation of the variables in
relation to each other.
Overall, the majority of research on intercountry adoption has examined the
Hague Convention. Some scholars have concluded that the Hague Convention may not
actually be as effective as intentioned in terms of protecting the rights of the child. For
instance, adoptive parents are more inclined to adopt from non-Hague signatories to
lessen the cost of intercountry adoption (Leblang et al., 2015). Also, the little research
into the effect of the Hague Convention on birth parents demonstrates that the
Convention does not necessarily seek to uphold birth parents’ rights. Lastly, variables
such as nationalist sentiment expressed, globalization, and colonial ties have been
examined primarily only in relation to adoptive parent preference. Therefore, variables
affecting adoption policy as well as the manifest and latent effects of the Hague
Convention warrant further study.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
My hypothesis is as follows: In comparing sending countries in intercountry
adoption, countries expressing higher nationalist sentiment will be more likely to have
more restrictive adoption policies than countries expressing lower nationalist sentiment.
Thus, my experiment entails analyzing nationalist sentiment in terms of the
restrictiveness of intercountry adoption policy. Given the tangential knowledge of the
effect of increased nationalist sentiment on adoption flows, doing so will most likely
prove a link between increased nationalist sentiment and increased adoption policy
restrictiveness. Because much of intercountry adoption research is qualitative, my
research will be quantitative in order to lessen the gap in empirical adoption research that
currently exists as well as because the nature of my variables lend themselves better to a
quantitative design.
The logic behind the hypothesis largely stems from the Leblang et al. (2015)
study, which demonstrated that adoptive parents are less likely to adopt from countries
expressing higher levels of nationalist sentiment. The researchers determined this not by
surveying adoptive parents, but by looking at the number of intercountry adoptions from
about twenty sending countries in relation to the nationalism of the executive branch.
Therefore, this phenomenon may be a result of policy restrictiveness making adoptions
from countries with higher nationalist sentiment harder to broker and thereby explaining
lower adoption flows from more nationalistic countries. Leblang et al. (2015) also
mentioned that some cultures view children as belonging to their country of birth—a
nationalistic view that would reasonably translate into greater restrictiveness in
intercountry adoption policy as such a view would logically lessen countries’ likelihood
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to act as sending countries in intercountry adoption. Additionally, other scholars have
suggested that political regimes more so than citizens feel that adopting out children to
foreign countries indicates the sending country’s inability to care for its citizens (Varnis,
2001). Considering the policy making function of government, such a governmental
nationalistic attitude would most likely be expressed in policy and thus support my
hypothesis.

METHODOLOGY
Operationalizing nationalism, the independent variable, requires a multifaceted,
holistic approach, as currently, no universally accepted definition of nationalism exists.
However, conceptualizations of nationalism in the current literature all connect
nationalism to an attitude of national superiority and desire to protect the interests of
one’s nation. For instance, Ahlerup and Hansson (2011) define nationalism as “an
ideology where the members of a nation, or nation-state, are held to have a duty to be
loyal to the nation and where the primacy of the welfare of the nation is emphasized,”
(432), while Smith and Kim (2004) define it as “a strong national devotion that places
one’s own country above all others,” (128). The language of these two definitions
demonstrates that the wellbeing of the nation is of prime importance in nationalistic
states. The vernacular often equates nationalism and patriotism; however, according to
Smith and Jarkko (1998), “feeling national pride is not equivalent to being nationalistic,”
(1). Although both stem from national pride, nationalism encompasses patriotism, which
is “love of one’s country or dedicated allegiance to same,” (Smith & Kim, 2004: 127).
Further reiterating that nationalism and patriotism are distinct concepts, Davidov (2009)
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found that nationalism and constructive patriotism “should be modeled separately” as
they “display different relations with other substantive variables,” (79).
A comparison of North Korea, a highly nationalistic state, and the United States, a
highly patriotic state, makes apparent the contrast between the concepts of nationalism
and patriotism. While Americans rank number one out of the thirty three countries
included in the International Social Survey Programme (2003-2004) in terms of national
pride, the country can be classified as highly patriotic rather than highly nationalistic due
to the absence of the hallmarks of nationalism at the foundational/governmental level.
For instance, the United States’ Constitution guarantees civil liberties essential to a free
society including freedom of speech, assembly, and religion. These freedoms arguably
comprise the core of American society to the extent that the government does not have
the capability to lead its citizens to believe false claims in an attempt to foster love of the
regime. Contrastingly, the citizens of North Korea, without these civil liberties, are led to
believe anything that the government tells them due to the regime’s complete control of
the media as well as by its restrictive international travel ban and severe Internet
restrictions. Therefore, in an attempt to control the citizenry and promote the North
Korean state, the government has restricted civil liberties to the point of completely
disillusioning its people. In its aforementioned practices, North Korea proves to be highly
nationalistic, as it ascribes to its key tenet of “placing one’s own country above all
others” although this necessitates the absence of civil liberties and strict governmental
control of information. As the comparison of North Korea and the United States
demonstrates, operationalizing nationalism for the purposes of this research requires
firmly distinguishing it from patriotism while navigating through the fact that popular
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conceptualizations of nationalism and patriotism may vary across cultures as asserted by
Davidov (2009). In order to combat varied interpretation regarding the definition of
nationalism, this study will operationalize nationalism by examining the trait at the
governmental level rather than among the citizenry via survey data.
Moreover, the current literature indicates that government perpetuated
nationalism is likely to have a greater effect on international adoption than does citizen
expressed nationalism. Recognizing that sending countries in intercountry adoption injure
their national pride by adopting out their children, Leblang et al., (2015) highlighted the
important fact that “politicians in sending countries often criticize the practice of
international adoption, as they seek to stir nationalist emotions and gain popularity,”
(619). Thus, the study measured nationalism via data from the World Bank’s Database of
Political Institutions (DPI) which measures the level of nationalism exhibited by a state’s
chief executive. Expanding upon this operationalization of nationalism, this study will
not only use this same measure but also examine other state level factors associated with
nationalism to produce a final judgement on the level of government-perpetuated
nationalism in each country. For instance, because Davidov (2009) found nationalism “to
be associated with authoritarianism,” each country in the sample will be deemed either
authoritarian or democratic as measured by Polity IV data.
Additionally, the presence of state-sponsored media within each country, as
measured by Reporters Without Borders’ 2015 World Press Freedom Index, is used as a
measure of nationalism since state-sponsored media is a key mechanism by which
nationalistic governments foster nationalism among the citizenry. With only limited or, in
some cases, completely restricted access to outside information not biased towards their
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country’s government, citizens of that country are more likely prone to favor the current
regime. This is evident in the case of North Korea, as the current regime utilizes the
absence of freedom of the press to manipulate its population in its favor. As a result, the
North Korean citizenry holds the regime in high esteem, albeit forced, uninformed
esteem, which demonstrates the state’s power to bias citizens’ perceptions in favor of the
regime and thereby foster nationalism.
Furthermore, I will operationalize nationalism using data from Freedom House’s
2015 Freedom in the World Index which evaluates the state of political and civil rights by
country. In terms of the separate categories of political rights and civil rights, the Index
rates each country on a one to seven scale, with one being the most free and seven being
the least free. The scores of the two categories are then averaged to produce an overall
freedom score. Key to evaluating civil liberties is a country’s allowance of freedom of
expression, religion, assembly, speech, and education. Countries with the best score in
the civil liberty category guarantee these freedoms. Because these freedoms are
associated with the free exchange of ideas and personal autonomy, they guarantee that
individuals are freely able to criticize their governments without fear of punishment, a
civil liberty which is more likely to be absent in a nationalistic regime working to ensure
that citizens respect, honor, and love the regime. The absence of or diminished expression
of freedom of religion also serves as a measure of nationalism as a state-mandated
religion or a regime’s strong preference towards a certain faith serves to homogenize the
citizenry and eliminate any threat to a nation’s strength as a unified group that could
result from religious differences.
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Key to evaluating political rights is a country’s commitment to free and fair
elections with competition among political parties and an absence of corruption.
Countries exhibiting these principles earn the best score in the political rights category.
Lower-scored countries exhibit varying degrees of election corruption. Scoring poorly in
the political rights category can speak to a regime’s level of nationalism since standing
political leaders of nationalistic countries are likely to prohibit or undermine candidates
or political parties that threaten the status quo and threaten the citizen’s devotion to the
most nationalistic party. Since factors other than nationalism can motivate election
corruption, this category is admittedly the weakest measure of nationalism in the data set.
However, because of the importance of competitive, free and fair elections and their
significance in ensuring that the voices of the citizenry rather than just those of the
regime are heard renders it relevant in this study’s operationalization of nationalism
which emphasizes regime-perpetuated rather than citizen-expressed nationalism.
Aside from explicitly governmental indicators of nationalism, citizen survey data
from the International Social Survey Program’s National Identity Model 2013 as well as
the World Values Survey, when available 1, is included in the holistic measure of
nationalism. Specifically, my research evaluated responses to this question from the
ISSP: “Some people say that the following things are important for being truly
[NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think it is to
have been born in [COUNTRY].” Respondents could answer with either very important,
fairly important, not very important, or not important at all. This question measures
nationalism because it seeks to uncover ethnocentric preferences within the citizenry as
1

Countries included in analysis for which ISSP National Identity Model 2013 data is available:
Denmark, Estonia, Georgia, Great Britain, Hungary, India, Japan, South Korea, Latvia, Lithuania,
México, Norway, Philippines, Russia, Spain
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well as to measure inclusivity in the society of other nationalities. In a more nationalistic
country, therefore, the citizenry will be more inclined to respond “very important” to this
question. From the World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 2, the holistic measure of
nationalism includes a 1/0 nationalism determination based on the following question:
“How much do you trust people of another nationality?” Possible responses to the
question included trust completely, trust somewhat, do not trust very much, and do not
trust at all. If a country had over 50% of responders combined responding with one of the
do not trust categories, then that country received a 1 to equate to nationalistic. This
rationale behind this coding relates back to one of the aforementioned key tenets of
nationalism, viewing one’s country as superior to all others. If respondents do not trust
those of other nationalities, then they are expressing nationalistic feelings of superiority.
Lastly, the holistic measure of nationalism includes economic indicators of
nationalism: intergovernmental organization (IGO) membership, number of import
partners, and number of import products. Firstly, using data from the CIA World
Factbook, the number of IGOs that a country is a member of serves as an indicator of
nationalism, with the fewer the IGOs a country is involved with, the more nationalistic.
The rationale behind this logic stems from nationalistic country’s motivation to isolate
themselves from global society due to perceived feelings of superiority and an
unfavorable attitude towards foreign involvement in their countries. Thus, with the fewest
number of IGOs any of the countries analyzed in this research are members of being 30,
countries that are members of 30-45 IGOs were coded as most nationalistic. Countries
2

Countries included in analysis for which World Values Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 data is
available: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Estonia,
Georgia, Guinea, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Malaysia, México, Morocco,
Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South
Korea, Spain, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan
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that are members of 46-65 IGOs were coded as moderately nationalistic, and those
countries that are members of 66 or more IGOs were coded as least nationalistic.
Next, a country’s number of import partners and import products serve as
nationalism indicators in the holistic nationalism measure under the assumption that the
fewer import partners and the fewer imported products brought into a country, the more
nationalistic that country. For instance, throughout the mid-1900s, Latin American
countries operated under the policy of import substitution industrialization (ISI) in order
to assert their economic independence from Western nations whom they felt taken
advantaged by and instead focused on internal development. Although the majority of
these nations were forced to expand their economy and conform to the policies of
neoliberalism due to having accrued large national debt, the policies of ISI demonstrate
nationalistic, domestically-focused economic policies. Thus, in some cases, a country
may limit its import
partners/products in order to be
independent and less
globalized, which can correlate
to nationalistic sentiment 3.

3

Number of import partners and a country’s corresponding nationalism classification:
24-120= most nationalistic
121-169 = moderately nationalistic
170- 229 = least nationalistic
Number of import partners and a country’s corresponding nationalism classification.
< 2,000 products: most nationalistic
2,001-4000 products: moderate
4001+: least nationalistic
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For each economic indicator, Freedom in the World score, World Press Freedom
Index score, and Polity IV score, specific scores corresponded to low, moderate, and high
levels of nationalism. Combined with EXECNAT data, ISSP and World Values Survey
Data, a final nationalism judgement for each country was determined, with the
possibilities being least, moderate, or most nationalistic. The distribution of the scores is
reflected in Graph 1.1.
In order to measure my dependent variable, level of adoption policy
restrictiveness, among nearly one-hundred sending countries, I have developed a
restrictiveness matrix with a maximum possible restrictiveness score of eighteen. This
score was derived from nine categorical components affecting the restrictiveness of a
state’s intercountry adoption policy. This model expands upon that of Breuning &
Kousser (2009), a study which categorized restrictiveness as whether or not existed in
each sending country “an official residency requirement for prospective adoptive
parents...and whether or not international adoption agencies or organizations were
allowed to operate within the country, (Breuning & Kousser, 2009: 93).” The first
component, residency requirements, can be significant barriers to foreign prospective
adoptive parents and thus necessitate inclusion into a policy restrictiveness score. A
residency requirement refers to a country mandating that prospective adoptive parents
(PAPs) reside in the country from which they desire to adopt for a given period of time,
ranging from weeks to years, and culminating with requiring that PAPs be legal citizens
of the desired sending country. To reflect the variations in residency requirements, the
residency requirement category is measured on a scale from 0 to 7, with the individual
scores equating to the following residency parameters:
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Score

Requirement

0

None

1

PAPs must travel to the country at the
beginning and/or end of the adoption process.

2

PAPs must reside in country for less than one
month.

3

PAPs must reside in country for one to three
months.

4

PAPs must reside in country for three to six
months.

5

PAPs must reside in country for six to
eighteen months.

6

PAPs must reside in country for eighteen
months or more.

7

PAPs must be a citizen of the sending
country.

Next, whether or not a country allows foreign adoption agencies to operate in
country warrants inclusion into the restrictiveness matrix because a country prohibiting
adoption agencies to operate constitutes a barrier to PAPs who desire a streamlined, easy
to navigate process as well as demonstrates a country’s aversion to intercountry adoption
in general (Leblang et al., 2015). This component was measured using a simple 1/0
measure, with countries that do not allow adoption agencies to operate in country
receiving a 1 and countries that permit and accredit foreign adoption agencies to operate
receiving a 0.
One of the seven additional restrictiveness measures is post-adoption reporting
requirements. Like residency requirements, countries’ post-adoption reporting
requirements vary and thus necessitate the following scale for scoring:

P a g e | 17

Score

Requirement

0

The country does not require post-adoption
reporting.

1

Only a few required reports for a period a few
years post adoption. 4

2

Annual reports required.

3

Reports multiple times a year for a certain
number of years post adoption followed by
annual reports.

4

Annual reports or multiple reports a year plus
periodic visits from adoption authorities in
receiving country.

5

Child must return to birth country for a visit
upon sending country’s legal request. 5

According to the US Department of State, “Post-adoption reports provide assurance to
the authorities of the child’s country of origin that children who are placed with
permanent families in the United States are receiving appropriate care and protection,”
(Post Adoption Reporting Overview). By requiring adoptive families to report on the
well-being of their adoptive children, sending states seek to maintain some of the control
over the adopted children that they allowed to be relinquished to foreigners. Because the
reports are means of maintaining control and power and because they constitute an extra
requirement for adoptive parents, post-adoption reporting requirements affect the
restrictiveness level of a country’s intercountry adoption policy and thus necessitates
inclusion into the restrictiveness matrix.

4
5

Belize and the Philippines each receive a score of 1.5 for unique requirements.
Only Pakistan has this requirement and receives this score.
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The remaining six categories used to operationalize policy restrictiveness are
religion, income, child, sexual orientation, and marriage requirements, and an “other”
category. All of these are scored on a 1/0, all or nothing scale. Religion requirements
refer to whether or not a country requires that PAPs be of a certain religion or of the same
religion as the child they adopt. This requirement constitutes restrictiveness because it
serves as a means of controlling who can adopt. Most Muslim countries, for instance,
require that PAPs also practice Islam, in an effort to preserve the cultural and religious
identity of the child and to ensure that he/she is raised according to the sending country’s
religious values. Next, income requirements refer to whether or not a country designates
a specific amount that PAPs must earn annually in order to adopt. This constitutes
restrictiveness because it serves as a means of excluding PAPs that do not meet the
sending country’s economic standards and the quality of life that is associated with them.
Next follow marriage, child, and sexual orientation restrictions. Many countries
have a marriage requirement by which single persons cannot adopt or can only adopt
older or special needs children. Countries that require PAPs to adopt as married couples
receive a 1 towards their restrictiveness total because this requirement is a means by
which sending countries have codified their cultural preference for a nuclear family and
thus exclude/restrict single persons from adopting. Sexual orientation is not a question in
countries that allow single individuals to adopt. However, sexual orientation restrictions
largely pertain to those countries stipulating that only married couples can adopt by
extending the restriction further to permit only heterosexual married couples to adopt.
Thus, sexual orientation restrictions further serve to preserve sending countries’ cultural
values and project those values onto foreign PAPs as a means of retaining cultural
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autonomy despite relinquishing children via intercountry adoption. Next, some countries
place restrictions on the nature of the families of PAPs, mostly regulating how many
biological children a couple can have. A country received a 1 in this category if it
specifies a limit on the number of children PAPs already have, if PAPs are prohibited
from having biological children and/or other adopted children, if the country prohibits
adoption based on the gender of PAPs pre-existing children, or if the country requires
proof of sterility. All of these potential restrictions are included in this research’s
restrictiveness matrix because they could constitute barriers to many PAPs and again
serves as a way for sending countries to engineer the “perfect” adoptive family according
to their cultural standards/preferences. Finally, the “Other” category accounts for those
unique restrictions not explicitly covered. For example, if a country requires that its
children eligible for adoption can only be adopted by family members, or if a country
stipulates that its children can only be adopted by foreign citizens as is the case in Haiti,
the country received a 1 added to its restrictiveness total.
The scores of the aforementioned restrictiveness components: residency,
operation of foreign adoption agencies, post-adoption reporting, religion, income,
marriage, children, sexual orientation, and other were calculated for each country and
added together for a maximum of eighteen points, with a score of eighteen equating to
maximum intercountry adoption policy restrictiveness. In terms of the states analyzed, I
utilized the list of over one-hundred sending countries studied by Breuning (2012), for it
is the most comprehensive, global sample of sending countries for which adoption policy
exists and can be measured. Thus, the countries analyzed by Breuning (2012) offer the
most clear/available picture of sending countries involved in intercountry adoption. For
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instance, her data does not include certain small states, most Arab states, and unstable or
failed states, as they do not have adoption policy to be analyzed (Breuning, 2012). Of the
analyzed sending countries, no country reached the maximum score on the restrictiveness
matrix. Indonesia received the highest score with fifteen. However, those six countries
that have banned intercountry adoption with no plans to reinstate the practice,
automatically received a score of eighteen to reflect their complete prohibition of the
practice. Those countries that have suspended intercountry adoption as they update their
policies and/or ratify the Hague Convention were excluded from analysis. As used
Breuning & Kousser (2009) and Breuning (2012), the source of the majority of
restrictiveness data in this study was the US Department of State, the United States’
central authority for intercountry adoption in accordance with Hague Convention
regulations. If the US State Department did not have all of the necessary data, I
supplemented it using intercountry adoption data from the French State Department as
well as from the adoption authorities of the individual countries themselves.
In addition to the independent and dependent variables studied, the control
variables of GDP ($), poverty rate, rate of natural increase, and birth control use were
accounted for in the research design in order to conduct the comparison of levels of
nationalist sentiment and level of adoption policy restrictiveness in the most conclusive
manner possible. According to the World Bank, the data source for GDP, “GDP at
purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the
products.” Thus, it is a measure of a country’s wealth and economic success. Controlling
for a country’s wealth is necessary in this research because a country that can afford to
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care for its children is unlikely to adopt many of them out internationally and thus is
likely to have more restrictive intercountry adoption policies. Poverty rate also has the
power to similarly affects a country’s intercountry adoption policy independent of
nationalism. If more of a country’s citizens live in poverty, that country is presumably
more likely to be less restrictive in its intercountry adoption policies because more of its
citizens will be less likely able to care for their children. Harsh living conditions due to
poverty could also render more children orphans in impoverished countries and thus
result in less restrictive intercountry adoption policies although this is not likely the case
in a highly nationalistic impoverished country.
The control variables of a country’s rate of natural increase as well as citizen use
of birth control also could impact intercountry adoption independent of nationalism and
thus necessitate attention. Firstly, rate of natural increase, or the birth rate of a country
minus the death rate, could affect intercountry adoption policy. Experiencing more deaths
than births, countries that experience a negative rate of natural increase can be reasonably
assumed to be less likely to adopt out many of its children internationally independent of
nationalist sentiment. Lastly, birth control use in a country could also influence that
country’s intercountry adoption policies. If more sexually active citizens are using birth
control, then it is reasonable to assume that more citizens are in control of the number of
children that they produce and are thus much less likely give up their children for
adoption, domestically or
internationally regardless of
nationalist sentiment of the
government.
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Upon scoring each country using the discussed restrictiveness matrix, fifty-four
countries were coded as having low intercountry adoption policy restrictiveness, thirty as
medium restrictiveness, and nine as high restrictiveness, as Graph 1.2 indicates. An
example of a country having the least restrictive intercountry adoption policies is South
Africa, who sent 114 children to the U.S. to be adopted from 2010-2016. South Africa
received a zero for restrictiveness as the country has no residency requirement, does not
require post-adoption reporting, and allows adoption agencies to operate in country. The
country also does not have formalized policy including more tedious restrictions such as
those involving marital status, sexual orientation, or number of children an adoptive
family has. Also in the low restrictiveness category is Haiti with a score of 4 on the
restrictiveness scale. Haiti sent nearly fifteen hundred children to the U.S. for adoption
between 2010 and 2016 and actually mandates that prospective adoptive parents be
residents of a foreign country, as a sort of reverse residency requirement excluding
Haitian citizens from adopting. In addition, Haiti’s adoption policy contains sexual
orientation and marriage restrictions as well as requires post-adoption reporting. Overall,
comparatively speaking, South Africa and Haiti both typify the zero to slightly restrictive
policies of countries placed in the low restrictiveness category.
An example typifying the medium restrictiveness category is Romania with a
score of nine. From 2010-2016, only eleven children were adopted out from Romania to
the United States although many children reside in Romanian orphanages in inhumane
conditions. Romania’s intercountry adoption policy prevents most from adopting because
prospective adoptive parents must be Romanian citizens and blood relatives of the child.
Additionally, the law requires post-adoption reporting every four months for two years.
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However, because Romania does not have any additional restrictive requirements, the
country fits into the medium restrictiveness category.
Receiving a score of fifteen, Indonesia is the only country that qualified for the
highly restrictive category based on the restrictiveness matrix. The country’s strict twoyear residency requirement, annual post-adoption reporting requirement, and the fact that
no foreign intercountry adoption agencies are permitted to operate in country renders
Indonesia highly restrictive. In addition, the country bans single individuals and same-sex
couples from adopting, and married prospective adoptive parents must either be
medically certified as childless, have only one child of their own, prove sterility, or have
previously adopted a child from Indonesia. Finally, Indonesia also requires that
prospective adoptive parents practice the same religion as the child to be adopted.
Because of all of the above restrictions, Indonesia possesses the most restrictive
intercountry adoption policies without having banned the practice entirely. Only 16
children have been adopted by US couples from Indonesia between 2010-2016, and they
correspond to the country’s restrictive policies.
Finally, these seven countries, Argentina, Cambodia, Cuba, Egypt, Guinea Bissau,
Mauritania, and Russia, received the maximum possible restrictiveness score of eighteen
by virtue of completely having banned intercountry adoption. As an Islamic country,
Egypt deserves special explanation as according to O’Halloran (2009), “Islam views
adoption as falsifying the identity of the individual, corrupting the integrity of bloodlines
and lineage, and as undermining the natural order of society,” (389). Significant social
stigma surrounding full adoption prevents adoption in Islamic countries as it is practiced
by Western receiving nations. Therefore, instead of practicing adoption as traditionally
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conceptualized in Western societies, Islamic societies such as Egypt only allow for
extended family adoption by which the child retains his or her familial name and identity
but is cared for by relatives other than the biological parents. This arrangement is called
kafala and signifies “a formal pledge to support and care for a specific orphaned or
abandoned child until he or she reaches maturity,” (380). Thus, Egypt in this analysis
serves to represent Islamic countries that do not recognize the institution of adoption as it
is traditionally practiced throughout the rest of the world.
Of additional note out of the most restrictive countries is Russia, which for years
had been one of the world’s top sending countries in intercountry adoption in terms of
number of children adopted out. For instance, over 3,000 Russian children were adopted
out to the United States from 2010-2013. However, in 2013, President Vladimir Putin
signed the Dima Yakovlev law into force. Named after a Russian child adopted by U.S.
citizens who tragically suffered an accidental death at the hands of his parents, the law
effectively cut all ties with the United States in the realm of intercountry adoption. The
law explicitly prohibits U.S. citizens from adopting from Russia and terminated the U.S.-Russia Adoption Agreement. Rather than arising out of a concern for child welfare,
however, the Dima Yakovlev law was enacted in response to the United States’
Magnitsky Act, which leveled sanctions on Russian officials accused of human rights
abuses (Siegel). Thus, at the expense of approximately half a million Russian orphans,
Russia banned the world’s top receiving country from adopting its children in order to
retaliate politically. Furthermore, Russia has also banned any countries that permit samesex marriage from adopting Russian children. As a result, Italy is the only country whose
citizens can adopt from Russia (Ford).
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DATA ANALYSIS
In order to determine the effect of nationalism on intercountry adoption policy, I
ran a linear regression accounting for the most nationalistic countries--those that received
a rating of “most” on the holistic nationalism measure--against the restrictiveness total.
The results proved to be statistically significant, demonstrating that the more nationalistic
a country, the more restrictive the country’s intercountry adoption policies with statistical
significance at .018. Thus, the results confirm my hypothesis. The graph below
demonstrates that countries that received the maximum nationalism score on the holistic
measure are twice as likely to have higher levels of adoption policy restrictiveness,
specifically a score of 7.5 or higher on the adoption
policy restrictiveness matrix. The linear regression
also included the control variables of rate of natural
increase, poverty rate, birth control use, and GDP
($). The only statistically significant variable
proved to be birth control use, meaning that the
more citizens using birth control in a country, the more likely it is that that country will
have more restrictive intercountry adoption policies. The model indicates that for every
10% increase in birth control use, adoption policy restrictiveness increases by eight
points. The graph below demonstrates this trend; as birth control use increases, the mean
predicted probability that a country will
have more restrictive intercountry adoption
policies also increases.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
With approximately one hundred and forty million orphans in our world
today, the institution of intercountry adoption has the potential to directly affect millions
of parentless children by providing them with forever homes (Orphans 2017). With the
many discussed restrictions on intercountry adoption, especially in recent years with the
suspension of intercountry adoption in several countries due to corruption and given the
severity of the global orphan crisis, this research is especially relevant. As the results of
this research demonstrated, more nationalistic regimes, such as Putin’s Russia, have more
restrictive intercountry adoption policies. In Russia, a country that has banned
intercountry adoption, millions of orphans are residing in orphanages rather than in the
care of loving families as a result of politically-motivated adoption restrictions. The
disconnect between Russia’s status as a signatory to the 1990 UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its current intercountry adoption policies demonstrate the ability
for regimes to advance their own interests over the human rights of citizens, in this case,
the human rights of orphans, some the most vulnerable children. In order to promote
children’s rights, signatories to the Convention on the Rights of the Child must be
committed to its principles. Article 3 of the Convention states that adults, particularly
policy makers, must be committed to protecting the best interest of children (Rights under
the Convention on the Rights of the Child 2014). With the results of this research
indicating that more nationalistic regimes are more restrictive in their intercountry
adoption policies, more nationalistic countries, by virtue of their nationalism,
demonstrate increased potential to violate Article 3 of the Convention, if intercountry
adoption is in the best interest of that country’s orphans. The Hague Convention on the

P a g e | 27

Protection of Children 1993 echoes this sentiment and recognizes that in some cases,
intercountry adoption is in the best interest of children, especially the orphaned or
abandoned with no domestic placement options.
Relating to that which is in the best interest of orphans and despite the millions of
them in the world today, corruption in the realm of intercountry adoption has recently
been of the utmost concern. Whereas intercountry adoption can be in the best interest of
children who otherwise would not have the opportunity to grow up in the care of a loving
family, unfortunately, the economic dimension of the practice in terms of supply and
demand drive corruption. For instance, Guatemala suspended intercountry adoptions in
2007 in order to attempt to eradicate the corruption involved in the process. Able to
falsify documents, Guatemalan attorneys were able to make children appear to be
orphans on paper, when in actuality, their mothers were usually coerced or tricked into
relinquishing their parental rights (Wheeler 2011). These attorneys operated this way in
order to profit and fulfill the demand for adoptable children in the United States. The
Hague Convention sought to address the problem of adoption corruption; however, recent
reports indicate that it has not succeeded. In March 2017, the Netherlands voted on
whether or not to eliminate the Convention altogether, a move that could have halted the
practice of intercountry adoption worldwide (Dale-Harris 2017). Although the
Netherlands maintained the Convention, the fact that its elimination was considered
demonstrates the fragility of the existence of intercountry adoption amidst concerns that
the practice harms more children than it helps. The results of this study seem to align
with concerns that intercountry adoption as a means of political expression serve to
advance state interests other than solely the protection of children.
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Overall, the practice of intercountry adoption should continue when intercountry
adoption is in the best interest of children, and the Hague Convention should thus be
upheld. In accordance with this statement, the United States has imposed stricter
requirements on adoption agencies operating in foreign countries. In acknowledgement of
the prevalence of corruption, these new requirements place increased responsibility on
US adoption agencies in ensuring that the adoptions the agency facilitates are legitimate.
Although demonstrably necessary, these increased restrictions serve to threaten the
practice of intercountry adoption all together as adoption agencies often do not have the
means of overseeing every step of the adoption process within the sending countries
(Wehrman 2017). Therefore, the practice of intercountry adoption is in jeopardy from all
sides, as both corruption and, ironically, the restrictions meant to eradicate it threaten its
ability to continue, despite its root intention of providing children with families.
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Appendix A
Sending Countries Included in Analysis and the Sources of Restrictiveness Data on Them
Algeria
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/algeria.html
Angola
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/angola.html
http://adopt.com/angola/index.html
Argentina
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/argentina.html
http://oas.org/dil/esp/Ley_de_Adopcion_Argentina.pdf
Armenia
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/armenia.html
Austria
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/austria.html
Bangladesh
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/austria.html
Belize
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/belize.html
Bhutan
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/bhutan.html
http://www.ncwc.gov.bt/en/files/publication/Child%20%20%20Adoption%20%20Rules
%20%20and%20Regulation%20of%20Bhutan%202015.pdf
http://ncwc.gov.bt/en/notification?tpages=12&id=107&page=11).
http://ncwc.gov.bt/en/files/publication/Child%20Adoption%20Act%20%20of%20Bhutan
%202012%20(CAA).pdf
Bolivia
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/bolivia.html
Brazil
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/brazil.html
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http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_Ato2007-2010/2009/Lei/L12010.htm
Bulgaria
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/bulgaria.html
http://mo-public.mjs.bg/
http://www.justice.government.bg/
Burkina Faso
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/burkina-faso.html
Burundi
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/burundi.html
Cambodia
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/cambodia.html
Cameroon
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/cameroon.html
Central African Republic
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/central-african-republic.html
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/vitalstatkb/Attachment925.aspx?AttachmentType=1
Chad
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/chad.html
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/vitalstatkb/Attachment987.aspx?AttachmentType=1
Chile
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/chile.html
http://www.sename.cl/web/adopcion-internacional/
China
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/china.html
Colombia
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/colombia.html
http://www.icbf.gov.co/portal/page/portal/PortalICBF/Especiales/prueba/Bienestar/Adop
ciones-back/Internacionales/USA-EstadosUnidos
Congo
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https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/democratic-republic-of-congo.html
Costa Rica
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/costa-rica.html
http://www.pani.go.cr/servicios/adopciones/adopciones-internacionales
Cuba
https://www.martinews.com/a/legal-obstacles-to-adoption-in-cuba/26601.html
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/cuba.html
Denmark
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/denmark.html
Djibouti
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/djibouti.html
Dominican Republic
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/dominican-republic.html
Ecuador
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/ecuador.html
Egypt
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/egypt.html
El Salvador
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/el-salvador.html
http://www.pgr.gob.sv/ado.html#extranjera&gsc.tab=0
Eritrea
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/eritrea.html
Estonia
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/estonia.html
Ethiopia
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/ethiopia.html
Fiji
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https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/fiji.html
Gabon
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/gabon.html
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/vitalstatkb/Attachment937.aspx?AttachmentType=1
Georgia
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/georgia.html
Guinea
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/guinea.html
Guinea Bissau
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/guinea-bissau.html
Guyana
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/guyana.html
Haiti
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/guyana.html
Honduras
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/honduras.html
http://adoption.gouv.qc.ca/download.php?f=f67003ad3beec841652b6a31c6916c23
Hungary
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/hungary.html
India
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/india.html
Indonesia
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/indonesia.html
Iran
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/iran.html

Israel
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https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/israel.html
http://www.molsa.gov.il/Populations/Youth/Adoption/International/Pages/MT01_02_06.
aspx
Jamaica
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/jamaica.html
Japan
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/japan.html
Kazakhstan
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/kazakhstan.html
Kyrgyzstan
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/kyrgyzstan.html
Latvia
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/latvia.html
Lebanon
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/lebanon.html
Liberia
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/liberia.html
Lithuania
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/lithuania.html
Madagascar
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/madagascar.html
Malawi
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/malawi.html
Malaysia
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/malaysia.html
Mali
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/mali.html
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Mauritania
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/mauritania.html
México
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/mexico.html
Moldova
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/moldova.html
Mongolia
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/mongolia.html
Morocco
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/morocco.html
Mozambique
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/mozambique.html
Nepal
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/nepal.html
Netherlands
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/netherlands.html
Nicaragua
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/netherlands.html
Niger
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/niger.html
Nigeria
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/nigeria.html
Norway
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/norway.html

Panama
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https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/panama.html
Papua New Guinea
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/papua-new-guinea.html
Paraguay
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/paraguay.html
Peru
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/peru.html
Philippines
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/philippines.html
Poland
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/poland.html
Romania
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/romania.html
Russia
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/russia.html
Sierra Leone
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/sierra-leone.html
Singapore
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/singapore.html
South Africa
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/south-africa.html
South Korea
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/south-korea.html
Spain
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/spain.html
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Sri Lanka
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/sri-lanka.html
Sudan
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/sudan.html
Tanzania
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/tanzania.html
Thailand
http://adoption.gouv.qc.ca/download.php?f=c7f3d62d46128bb6aed3ea6b104773a3
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/thailand.html
Togo
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/togo.html
Trinidad and Tobago
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/trinidad-and-tobago.html
http://www.ttparliament.org/legislations/a2000-67.pdf
Ukraine
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/ukraine.html
United Kingdom
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/united-kingdom.html
Uruguay
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/uruguay.html
Uzbekistan
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/uruguay.html
Vietnam
https://travel.state.gov/content/adoptionsabroad/en/country-information/learn-about-acountry/vietnam.html
http://adoption.gouv.qc.ca/download.php?f=8ab7cf7f9e1c3eea812e6976d1c7fb62
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Appendix B
Operationalization of Independent and Dependent Variables
Independent Variable: Adoption Policy
Restrictiveness

Dependent Variable: Nationalism

Residency Requirement

EXECNAT 2015 Data from the World Bank’s
Database of Political Institutions:
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERN
AL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentM
DK:20649465~pagePK:64214825~piPK:6421
4943~theSitePK:469382,00.html

Post-Adoption Reporting Requirements

Polity IV Score, Center for Systemic Peace:
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4x.
htm

Ability of International Adoption Agencies to
Operate in Country

World Press Freedom Index (2015):
https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2015

Religion Requirements

Freedom in the World Index (2015):
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/freedom-world-2015#.WhJtZbT821s

Income Requirements

Citizen Survey Data from the World Values
Survey Wave 6: 2010-2014 and International
Social Survey Program 2013:
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnli
ne.jsp
https://www.gesis.org/issp/modules/isspmodules-by-topic/national-identity/2013/

Marriage Requirements

IGO Membership, CIA World Factbook:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/fields/2107.html#ag

Sexual Orientation Restrictions

Number of Import Partners, The World Bank:
https://wits.worldbank.org/countrystats.aspx?l
ang=en

Children Restrictions

Number of Import Products, The World Bank:
https://wits.worldbank.org/countrystats.aspx?l
ang=en

P a g e | 40

Other

Appendix C
Control Variables
Variable

Source(s)

Birth Control Use (Any)

WorldPopData:
http://www.worldpopdata.org/index.php/table

GDP

The World Bank:
http://data.worldbank.org/country

Poverty Rate

The World Bank:
http://data.worldbank.org/country
CIA World Fact Book:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/fields/2046.html#da
UN Data:
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=poverty&d=MDG
&f=seriesRowID%3a581

Rate of Natural Increase

WorldPopData:
http://www.worldpopdata.org/index.php/table

